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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Project aims and policy context
Higher density housing (HDH) and social housing are critical aspects of compact city
and affordable housing policies in Australia. Moreover, population growth, falling
household size and increased competition for land and resources ensures the
continuing centralisation of HDH in planning policy and practice in the future
(Productivity Commission 2011). However, there is growing evidence that HDH has
been subject to significant resident opposition. This has raised new questions around
the place of participatory planning approaches in development assessment, and in
particular, the role of third party objection and appeal rights―the key focus of this
project.
While third-party objection and appeal rights (TPOAR) are associated with greater
public participation in planning, the use of TPOAR to oppose HDH potentially has
significant impacts on housing supply and the achievement of compact city and social
housing policies. The extent to which TPOAR should or could be incorporated into
development assessment has received national policy attention through the Council of
Australian Governments (COAG), while the Federal Government has already worked
with state and territory planning authorities to remove TPOAR in the roll-out of its 5
billion dollar Social Housing Initiative. However, removing or streamlining TPOAR
limits the rights of residents to influence development. It also raises more fundamental
concerns around democracy, planning and rights to the city. This can result in both
negative perceptions of the planning process and electoral backlashes which in turn
lead to uncertain planning contexts.
As the stakes for compact cities and affordable housing outcomes are raised, this
paper outlines a research project to assess the efficacy and equity of different levels
of third-party objection and appeal rights in the context of compact city and affordable
housing policies. The aim of the project is to expand the evidence base regarding
participatory planning approaches and housing supply. To these ends, the project
firstly compares the impact that different levels of TPOAR have on housing supply,
public perceptions of planning and participatory planning goals. Secondly, the project
aims to develop new insights into the best approach for managing and mediating
resident opposition to HDH and social housing.

Literature review and key debates
Third-party objection and appeal mechanisms are broadly acknowledged across the
literature for their contribution to participatory planning outcomes. However, the extent
to which TPOAR achieve participatory planning goals has also been questioned. A
review of the literature shows that TPOAR may result in adversarial rather than
deliberative review processes; mediate conflict between developers and elite
residents rather than the wider public; draw resources away from other participatory
planning styles (e.g. community consultation at earlier stages of the planning
process); and that courts of appeal may take planning authority away from elected
officials at the local level. In addition, there is a widespread assumption in Australia
that TPOAR can potentially inhibit and delay planning approval and development
processes, including housing supply.
The tension between participatory goals on the one hand and efficiency in planning
approval on the other, is reflected in contemporary planning reform both federally and
at the state level in Australia. Despite strong rhetorical support for public
accountability, engagement and third-party rights; recent discussion (and to some
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extent policy reform) has been substantively focused on streamlining TPOAR. This
interest is often premised on streamlining housing supply.
However, there are significant gaps in the evidence-base regarding HDH in current
policy trajectories. In particular, the extent to which TPOAR are used to resist HDH,
and the impact of TPOAR on housing approvals is yet to be established in Australia at
the metropolitan scale. Similarly, the extent to which the removal of TPOAR influences
housing supply timelines has not been rigorously examined. There is also surprisingly
little qualitative data comparing residents’, planners’ and developers’ perceptions of
different levels of objection and appeal around HDH or the extent to which these
different approaches meet or fall short of wider participatory planning aims of
accountability and public engagement.

The Victorian policy context
To address these gaps, this paper sets out a research project that explores the
impacts of two different levels of TPOAR in terms of housing supply and participatory
planning expectations. The project focuses on the state of Victoria. This is an ideal
case to explore both full TPOAR and fast-tracking approaches, because the planning
system uniquely combines strong third-party appeal rights with a range of streamlined
approaches. The Productivity Commission reported that with 3326 appeal cases,
Victoria had nearly six times the number of planning appeals as any other Australian
jurisdiction in 2009–10 (Productivity Commission 2011, p.84). At the same time, and
with equal significance for this project, the use of various fast-tracking
mechanisms―including ministerial call-in powers, zones and overlays―has been
significant (Productivity Commission 2011). Exemptions are now widespread and take
a variety of forms, creating a complex array of varying requirements for permit
approvals and TPOAR on housing developments. As a result, the Victorian planning
policy framework provides the most complete set of appeals and approval data
through which to analyse key variations in both participatory and fast-tracked planning
processes and housing outcomes at the metropolitan scale in Australia. It therefore
also comprises a cost-effective option in developing data for both planning
approaches.

Method and next steps
The project uses a mixed methods approach. Quantitative analysis will be undertaken
of the spatial and temporal variations in the number, rate, type and location of
planning permits, fast tracking processes (including ministerial ‘call-ins’) and appeals
across Melbourne municipalities with particular focus on higher density and social
housing. Throughout the report, higher density housing refers to multi-unit dwelling,
with a particular focus on development of ten or more dwellings. Modelling techniques
will be used to test the extent to which planning processes are distributed across
different housing market conditions and socio-economic profiles.
Qualitative case studies will build on quantitative work by deepening analysis of the
impacts of TPOAR/fast-track approaches on housing supply and providing a new set
of 18 semi-structured qualitative interviews documenting resident, developer and
planning perceptions of the effectiveness of these two models.
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1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Background

The provision of higher density and social housing in existing urban areas is a critical
component of contemporary Australian housing and planning policy agendas. Higher
density housing (HDH) in this report refers to multi-unit dwelling, with a particular
focus on development of ten or more dwellings.1 The provision of such housing takes
place in the context of competing pressures: the economic imperatives of the housing
industry; environmental concerns focused on ‘compact cities’; housing policy and
welfare initiatives to provide well-located affordable housing; and resident concerns
about changing neighbourhoods.
This project focuses on resident concerns about changing neighbourhoods: as part of
a democratic ethos of public participation in planning, many Australian jurisdictions
provide third-party rights of objection and appeal on development applications (Ryan
2001; McFarland 2011; Cook 2006, 2011). These rights have the potential to influence
development approval processes and housing market outcomes. They also have the
capacity to significantly affect, and potentially inhibit, the achievement of ‘compact city’
and social housing objectives. As debates around the merits of third-party objection
and appeal attract increasing attention, and the stakes for compact cities, affordable
housing outcomes and citizens’ rights are raised, an assessment of the efficacy and
equity of third-party objection and appeal is required.
This Positioning Paper is the first output of a research project designed to explore the
relationship between third-party objection and appeal rights, housing supply and
participatory planning aims. The project approaches these questions by systematically
comparing the distribution and impacts of two different models of third-party appeal
rights on planning approval processes, housing outcomes and public perceptions of
planning. The first model comprises formal third-party objection and appeal rights
(TPOAR), a common (but not universal) approach to planning approvals following
reforms in the 1970s towards greater public participation in planning. Full TPOAR
allow third-parties to object and appeal development permit decisions of planning
authorities. The second model is characterised by a range of ‘fast-tracked’ planning
processes that bypass TPOAR to facilitate development. In Victoria this approach has
been used for projects of state and national significance, including the $5.238 billion
roll-out of social and medium density housing through the Federal Nation Building
Stimulus Package (2008–12).
These two models have significant implications for housing and participatory planning
outcomes and a high profile in planning reform. Notably, in its review of the Australian
planning system, the Productivity Commission (2011) questioned variations in thirdparty appeals. Through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), states and
territories are also exploring options to streamline development approval processes.
Yet the removal of TPOAR also marks a significant reconfiguration of citizens’ rights.
This can be particularly contentious where development is classified as high-risk or
high-impact (Productivity Commission 2011) and raises fundamental questions about
democracy, planning and rights to the city.
In the context of HDH, finding the balance between streamlining TPOAR while making
allowance for the reasonable rights of residents to influence development is a key
1

The definition of higher density housing used in this report reflects our key concern with compact city
and urban consolidation policies and characteristics of available data. The latter is set out in more detail
in Chapters 4 and 5.
2
The study was based on a sample of 24 cities and towns in Australia with populations of more than
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policy challenge. However, there are significant gaps in our understanding of the
relationship between TPOAR and HDH. We have little sense of the extent to which
TPOAR are used to appeal HDH and social housing at the metropolitan scale, or of
who is most likely (or able) to appeal. Moreover, the views of stakeholders involved in
appeal processes, including residents, developers and planning authorities, regarding
the efficacy of TPOAR have not yet been established.
By assessing the impact that different levels of TPOAR have on housing approvals,
participatory planning goals, and public perceptions of planning, this project aims to
address these gaps.

1.1.1 Research questions
To these ends, the project addresses the following research questions:
1. What is the extent of variation in formal third-party objection and appeal rights?
How and why has this changed over time?
2. What are the variations of formal objections and appeals in the planning system?
3. What are the characteristics of ‘streamlined’ housing projects that bypass local
objections?
4. What are the implications of different types of TPOAR for:
a) the housing supply pipeline
b) resident perceptions of planning processes
c) participative planning goals.

1.1.2 Scope of the study
In order to explore the relationship between TPOAR, housing supply and participatory
planning aims, the project employs a combination of methods and develops in several
stages.
First, a review of national and international approaches to TPOAR compared to fasttracked planning mechanisms, with limited or no third-party appeal rights, will be
conducted.
Second, quantitative data will make significant inroads into our understanding of the
impact of TPOAR and streamlined approaches in terms of housing supply and
participatory planning aims at a metropolitan scale.
Our project focuses on the state of Victoria, which presents an ideal case to explore
appeals data because the planning system uniquely combines strong TPOAR with a
range of streamlined approaches. Significantly for this project, and unlike other
jurisdictions, the number of planning appeals in Victoria is high. The Productivity
Commission reported that with 3326 appeal cases, Victoria had nearly six times the
number of planning appeals as any other Australian jurisdiction in 2009–10
(Productivity Commission 2011, p.84). As a result, Victorian appeals data provides a
unique opportunity in the Australian context to measure the extent of public opposition
to HDH along with variations in planning processes and housing outcomes under two
different models at the metropolitan scale.
Quantitative analysis will explore the impact of TPOAR and fast-track approaches on
housing supply. This includes a systematic analysis of planning permit activity, the
use of fast tracking planning processes and of planning tribunal appeals data.
Together these data will uncover spatial and temporal variations in the number, rate,
type and location of planning permits, fast tracking processes (including ministerial
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‘call-ins’) and planning appeals across Melbourne municipalities, with particular focus
on higher density and social housing. A dataset will be constructed for the project and
then analysed to understand variations in the way planning appeals and fast tracking
processes occur for housing. The numbers and types of dwellings built in different
locations through different planning streams in Victoria will be identified and
compared. In terms of participatory planning aims, modelling techniques will also be
used to test the extent to which planning processes are distributed across different
housing market conditions and socio-economic profiles.
Third, in-depth qualitative case studies of three higher density housing development
sites will deepen the understanding of the impact of TPOAR compared to fast-track
approaches in relation to the following three key criteria:
1. Impacts on housing supply pipelines from planning to construction.
2. Resident, planners’ and developers’ perceptions of the planning process.
3. The realisation of participative planning goals.
Case studies will build on quantitative data in two key ways. In terms of the impact of
TPOAR on housing supply, the case studies will deepen analysis by assessing the
impact of different levels of TPOAR from the initial permit application to final
construction. Thus the case studies will provide an opportunity to link planning
approval, appeals and construction data over the life of the project. The case studies
will also identify stakeholders’ perceptions of the planning process. Specifically
whether different levels of TPOAR and appeal fuel or limit ongoing mobilisation by
objectors. They will also provide an opportunity for stakeholders to reflect on the
efficacy of TPOAR and fast-track approaches in terms of their perceptions of the
planning process. The case studies will be developed with clear reference to policy
frameworks, informed by quantitative data collection and based interviews with
resident opposition groups, developers and planners along with media analysis and
site observations. Each case study will include six semi-structured qualitative
interviews with key stakeholders.
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2

POLICY CONTEXT

The provision of HDH takes place in the context of competing pressures. Population
growth, falling household size and increased competition for land and resources
ensures the continuing centralisation of HDH in planning policy and practice
(Productivity Commission 2011). HDH also plays a key role in housing supply more
broadly, with many Australian cities setting high targets for in-fill development as a key
strategy in enabling supply and affordability in the next two decades (NHSC 2010).
However, the most recent study of resident perceptions of population and housing
density in Australia identified ‘major residential developments’ and ‘increasing
population density’ as key concerns (Productivity Commission 2011, p.xxxviv).2
Together these intersecting trends pose a complex policy dilemma: how to meet
dwelling targets in existing urban areas while making allowance for the reasonable
rights of residents to influence development. In this chapter we set these trends out in
more detail.

2.1

Compact city initiatives

Urban consolidation policies have been pursued in most Australian cities since the
early 1980s (Yates 2001; Searle 2004; Randolph 2006; Searle 2007). In recent years
the strategic plans for Melbourne (State of Victoria 2002), Perth (WAPC and
Department of Planning and Infrastructure 2004), Sydney (NSW Department of
Planning 2005), and Brisbane (Office of Urban Management 2005) have all had a
strong focus on containment and urban consolidation (see also Forster 2006; Hamnett
& Kellett 2007). Population growth, falling household size and increased competition
for land and resources have also seen the centralisation of consolidation policies in
more recent planning reforms (Productivity Commission 2011).
Urban consolidation policies seek to redirect urban growth away from the traditional
suburban, low-density urban fringe and towards existing urban areas. While the
environmental and social benefits of medium density housing compared to the
traditional ‘quarter-acre block’ remain contested (Troy 1996; Randolph 2004; Searle
2004; Birrell et al. 2005; Mees 2010), consolidation policies have been widely adopted
with the aim of achieving three interconnected objectives: containing urban sprawl and
limiting environmental footprint; ensuring the supply of affordable and social housing
in well-located areas with access to services, jobs and public transport; and ensuring
ongoing housing supply against demographic change, including population growth
and changes in household size and composition (Newman & Kenworthy 1999; Low
2002; Goodman & Moloney 2004; Buxton & Scheurer 2005).
These objectives are reflected in the metropolitan planning policies of Australian
capital cities, including the: Melbourne 2030 strategy; Melbourne @ 5 Million Update;
South East Queensland Regional Plan, and the Sydney City of Cities policy. Because
HDH has the potential to maximise benefits of local services and employment, it has
become a preferred development type for social housing (e.g. the recent Federal
Government Social Housing Initiative). While the implementation of consolidation
policies has been mixed (Yates 2001; Downs 2005; Filion & McSpurren 2007; Gurran
& Phibbs 2008; O'Connell 2009), the timely and efficient supply of HDH remains a key
strategy in achieving a more compact city form (Hamnett & Kellett 2007).

2

The study was based on a sample of 24 cities and towns in Australia with populations of more than
50 000 people. The data comprised, in most cases, a minimum of 100 interviews in each local
government area across the 24 cities (Productivity Commission 2011).
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2.2

Housing supply pressures

Maintaining housing supply in the face of rising demand in Australian cities, and in
particular the need for more affordable housing within existing urban areas, is a
prominent policy issue in Australia (NHSC 2010). The challenges of providing
affordable housing are significant: supply lags behind demand with a current shortfall
of 180 000 homes and a projected shortfall by 2014 of 308 000 dwellings (NHSC
2010). Up to 1 000 000 households already in the market are experiencing housing
stress and this is likely to double within the next 40 years (Yates et al. 2007).
Several recent initiatives of the Federal Government have focused on increasing
supply, and the efficiency of supply, of affordable housing (see Federal Government
Social Housing Initiative; Housing Affordability Fund; Housing Supply Council; and
COAG Housing Supply and Affordability Reform Agenda). Providing HDH also
currently forms a key component of many recent metropolitan strategies in Australia.
In its comparison of Australian Strategic Planning Instruments, the National Housing
Supply Council (2010) has shown that Sydney, Melbourne, South East Queensland,
Perth and Adelaide have all set aims for at least 50 per cent of new dwellings
constructed in in-fill areas within two decades.

2.3

Resident resistance to HDH and social housing

Despite the key place of HDH in contemporary strategic planning policy, it has also
been the subject of significant resident opposition. Bunker et al. (2002, p.143) note
with reference to Australian city planning as a whole that ‘the reaction and response of
local government authorities and communities [to urban consolidation] has been
mixed and increasingly hostile’. The implementation of urban consolidation in
Australian cities has been characterised by political conflict, with owner groups and
developers aligned against different aspects of containment and densification (Bunker
et al. 2002; Bunker et al. 2005; Randolph 2006). Searle (2007, p.1) reviewed the
Sydney experience and ‘the way in which planning power, political power and market
power have been used to make urban consolidation happen in the face of community
opposition’. He highlights that consolidation has, from the outset, been opposed at the
local level in Australian cities, including resistance by local government and resident
objection. In an earlier study, Huxley (2002) argued the intrusion of medium density
housing in established suburbs in Melbourne was the key factor in the emergence of
the resident action group Save our Suburbs in Melbourne in the late 1990s (see also
Lewis 1999). In the New Zealand context, Vallance et al. (2005) have shown that HDH
in established suburbs create feelings of alienation as established patterns of
behaviour are disrupted.
Public housing is also subject to significant stigmatisation so that local government
and residents often reject the siting of public housing in their neighbourhoods
(Atkinson & Jacobs 2008). Despite long term disinvestment in the sector, Jacobs et al.
(2010) argue that efforts to increase the supply of social housing through the Nation
Building program in 2008 was ‘hampered’ by NIMBY-style responses. This included
projects employing a mix of social and market housing (Le 2010). Local opposition
was also reported in the press regarding social housing initiative projects (Dowling
2009). The construction of community care homes for people with intellectual
disabilities has also met with resident resistance (Bostock et al. 2004).
Resident opposition to development can contribute to a backdrop of anti-development
sentiment in particular localities or regions. Searle (2007) has documented the longstanding and bitter stand-off over densification between the local councils of Sydney’s
north shore and the New South Wales Government, underscored by significant
resident protest. Media analysis suggests the ongoing mobilisation of residents
7

around consolidation strategies (Lewis 1999; Huxley 2002; Searle 2007). Studies from
NSW Local Government Areas (LGAs) Penrith and Canada Bay (Cook 2006; Cook &
Ruming 2008) and high-profile conflicts, notably the Camberwell Station case in
Melbourne, show that attempts to reduce consultative measures for large housing
projects can result in politicisation and further delays. This point was explored by the
Productivity Commission (2011) in its discussion of community interaction and the
repercussions of not involving the community in planning decisions. Searle and Fillion
(2011, p.1432) suggested that planners must ‘tread carefully for there is always the
possibility of a wider anti-intensification coalition with possible electoral repercussions
on senior governments’ (see also Huxley 2002; Searle 2007).
However, if residents or third parties decide to formally object or appeal permitted
planning applications through the planning process, they can also have a direct
impact on housing outcomes. It has been argued for instance, that appeals add time,
uncertainty and holding costs to approval processes with implications for housing
development pipelines (Simonson 1996; Productivity Council of Australia 2002,
quoted in Willey 2006). Recent high profile reports in Australia have suggested that
there are increased developer risks, and greater construction costs, associated with
higher density housing in existing urban areas (Productivity Commission 2011; Kelly
et al. 2011). The recent Grattan Institute report specifically identified TPOAR as a
factor impeding housing supply in existing urban areas (Kelly et al. 2011).
The intersection of resident opposition with HDH can inhibit compact city and urban
consolidation policies. But the use of TPOAR to resist HDH also raises questions of
equity and access in planning processes. Studies suggest that TPOAR are most
commonly accessed by a small proportion of residents from localities of high socioeconomic status (Woodcock et al. 2011; Searle 2007). This may reflect the distribution
of HDH as investors seek opportunities in higher amenity locations (Huxley 2002).
However, the most recent data for Melbourne suggests a likely wealth effect. In their
study of planning appeals and the distribution of HDH, Woodcock et al. (2011, p.7)
found that even though HDH is distributed widely across the metropolitan area,
including in lower-income suburbs, ‘those LGAs with the highest proportion of
contestation are also those with the highest socio-economic status (SES) residents’.
Huxley (2002) argues that because successful objections hinge on knowledge, time
and economic resources, they can be seen as an indicator of areas of planning
influence (Huxley 2002; also see Dovey et al. 2009). This reflects work by Engels
(1999) where capacities to formally object were correlated with rich networks of
economic and social capital. A recent assessment of the NSW Standing Committee
on State Development (2009, p.48) revealed the cost of making appeals to the NSW
Land and Environment Court was between $150 000 to $200 000 and therefore a
significant barrier for most citizen objectors.
Overall, opposition to HDH presents a complex policy challenge: how to meet key
planning policy outcomes while making allowance for the reasonable rights of
residents to influence development. Before setting out a research project designed to
expand the evidence-base underpinning this challenge, the next chapter defines
TPOAR and highlights international debates and emerging trends in Australian policy
towards streamlining objection and appeal processes.
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3

THIRD-PARTY OBJECTION AND APPEAL RIGHTS

Third-party objection and appeal rights in planning are often associated with greater
public participation and opportunities for non-expert engagement in development
decisions. Key arguments in favour of TPOAR in planning assessment processes are
based on their potential to increase avenues for public engagement with planning, and
ultimately to deliver better planning decisions. To the extent that planning is
considered a communicative process (Healey 1997), it is argued that mechanisms of
deliberation and increasing opportunities for participation can result in improved
planning outcomes (Willey 2006). The combination of a broader base of input (beyond
just elected officials and appointed experts), increased debate on planning issues and
the mechanisms for local knowledge to inform planning approvals are some of the
benefits that TPOAR affords. TPOAR are therefore expected to lead to improved
‘public good’ outcomes (Willey 2006).
However, TPOAR have been criticised on a number of grounds, including equity of
access and the removal of planning control from the local level. TPOAR also vary
significantly across jurisdictions. Before exploring these debates and differences in
more detail, this section first provides key models and definitions of TPOAR. This
includes an overview of the ‘typical’ place of objection and appeal in relation to the
wider planning process using the Victorian model as an example.

3.1

Models and definitions

Third-party objection and appeal rights (TPOAR) form a part of development approval
processes in many Australian and overseas jurisdictions. Development approval
processes are themselves only part of broader planning policy frameworks of
legislation and strategic planning policy documents. Figure 1 below indicates typical
opportunities for third-party engagement in planning processes in Australia. As shown
in the top section of Figure 1, the formulation of policy and strategic plans afford the
first opportunity for broader community engagement in planning. These planning
policies then typically determine whether or not a proposed use or development will
require development approval. Dependent on the applicable policy framework and on
the nature of the proposed development, approvals will then follow one of two broad
‘tracks’. In the first, there is limited or no provision for third-party involvement in the
determination of the development application. In the other, some provision is made for
third-party involvement.
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Figure 1: Development Approval Processes and Public Engagement: Typical Australian
model
Planning Policy Formation
Opportunities for third-party input, including via consultation and participation in policy
formation; or objection to planning scheme amendments.

Development Approval Process
Permit application

‘Fast track’

‘Standard track’

Limited or no TPOAR

Exhibition with opportunity for thirdparty objection and appeal.

Typical outcome: Responsible
authority approves; approves with
conditions; or rejects.

Typical outcome: Responsible
authority approves; approves with
conditions; or rejects.

Potential for firstparty appeal
only.

Potential for first
OR third-party
appeal.

Appeal process

Application outcome
Approved; approved with conditions; rejected.

Within the development approval process, there are two distinct phases of potential
third-party involvement. These comprise objections during the planning permit
application process; and appeals to the planning permit decision. If a planning
authority refuses a planning permission or places conditions upon it, an applicant
typically has the right to appeal (first-party appeal rights). If an authority grants a
planning permission, third parties (typically objectors) may have the right to appeal the
decision. The links between rights of objection and rights of appeal vary. In some
jurisdictions there is a right to objection but not to appeal. In others, the right of appeal
is limited to third parties who have lodged an initial objection. There is also variation in
how ‘third-party’ is defined across jurisdictions. For example, in Victoria anyone can
object to and then appeal a permit decision; while in others jurisdictions (NSW, SA)
appellants must have a ‘relevant interest’ in the proposed development, with interest
typically determined by either proximity to the proposed development, or via a hearing
to determine relevance (Trenorden 2009). Either way, appeals on merit are carried out
in ‘formal or quasi-formal legal settings’, such as the VCAT in Victoria or the Land and
Environment Court in NSW (Willey 2005, p.268).
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3.2

Debates in the literature

Even though TPOAR are seen as mechanisms ensuring transparency and oversight
in land use decisions, they have also been criticised on a number of grounds. These
debates challenge the idea of TPOAR as a mechanism of planning accountability and
transparency. They also raise questions around what style and level of TPOAR are
best suited to the achievement of higher density and more affordable cities and
suburbs. As we set out next, these debates centre on four key themes: equity,
hierarchies of participation, political transparency, and efficiency.

3.2.1 TPOAR and equity
To what extent does TPOAR ensure that planning processes are open to scrutiny and
deliberation by the public? Advocates of TPOAR argue that they provide equity of
process (H Ellis 2000; Purdue 2001; G Ellis 2006; Willey 2006). G Ellis (2006, p.334,
original emphasis) argues that first-party (applicant) rights of appeal provide a
challenge only to ‘weak refusals’ of permits. Third-party appeal rights are required to
balance this with the ability to challenge ‘weak permissions’. Therefore, if an applicant
has right of appeal, then a third party must also have right of appeal to maintain
equity. Developers wield considerable political and economic power, and are prepared
to contest permit decisions. As Willey (2006, p.384) argues, ‘if one accepts that the
function of planning appeals is not confined to protecting a dogmatic property rights
regime, then the argument that participants other than developers need to be able to
access the appeals system starts to hold more weight’.
However, despite support for TPOAR within collaborative planning frameworks
(Healey 1997), there is clear tension between the idea of communicative rationality
underpinning the collaborative planning model and the adversarial engagement of
formal appeal processes (Trenorden 2009). The notion that third-party rights improve
decision-making is also questioned, particularly in light of the substantial time and cost
impacts it can have on development, as discussed below (Ellis 2000; Whelan 2006).
Given that equity of access to planning decisions is a common justification for
TPOAR, a significant limitation is the relative lack of equity in its engagement of
citizens. Supporters of TPOAR acknowledge that the majority of people lodging thirdparty appeals come from an educated, well resourced minority, which raises
questions about the extent to which objections are representative of community
interests (Finkler 2006; G Ellis 2002; Willey 2006). Further, Finkler (2006) highlights
the potentially discriminatory nature of TPOAR, with a bias in notifications of
development to landlords over tenants; and examples of the deliberate use of thirdparty appeal to exclude unwanted residents. An implication is that, if unchecked,
TPOAR can effectively ‘become a tool to be exploited by elitist and capitalist interests
at the expense of the vulnerable’ (Willey 2006, p.380).

3.2.2 TPOAR and public participation
A common argument against TPOAR is that they detract from other more proactive
public engagement and participation in policy and planning. As indicated in Figure 1,
the planning approval process occurs within a wider framework of policy-making. It is
argued that a focus on proactive, higher order engagement leads to better policy and
greater certainty in processes. The recent Productivity Commission (2011) inquiry into
planning and development approvals, for example, identified the need for planning
policy outcomes to be dictated higher up the chain in the planning-to-approval
process, and influenced by early community engagement. It is argued that where
effective early public engagement is provided, TPOAR result in unnecessary
duplication of existing merits-based review (Whelan 2006). They can also encourage
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reactive rather than proactive strategic planning, countering the objectives of
collaborative planning (Whelan 2006).
However, others dispute the argument that TROAR and strong collaborative planning
are in opposition (H Ellis 2000; Willey 2006; Trenorden 2009). Trenorden (2009)
highlights weaknesses in the argument that higher order engagement absolves the
needs for TPOAR, arguing that citizens cannot be expected to understand the full
implications of planning policy, and therefore should have the right to appeal discrete
decisions. Further, she argues that in practice planning policy does not provide for
clear and prescriptive development outcomes and that development approvals are in
part discretionary. As such, TPOAR are important to ensure that community
expectations established in policy are carried through to planning approval decisions.
Rather than undermining collaborative planning, it is argued that ‘…the very existence
of TPOAR compels developers to engage more fully, sincerely and legitimately with
the community’ (Willey 2006, p.376).
Framing debates about the procedural merits of different development approval
systems are the cultural and ideological arguments about the role of individual
property rights on the one hand versus the right of community participation in
decision-making on the other (Willey 2006), and the role of the state in providing for or
impinging upon these rights. Appeal rights were originally enshrined in planning
systems as a measure of protection for landholders against excessive government
interventions and not necessarily as a means to facilitate citizens’ engagement in
planning, with public accountability instead catered for by elected representatives (H
Ellis 2000; Purdue 2001). Commonly, third-party appeal rights were not initially
conceived of as an important part of planning approval processes, and many see a
move to greater third-party rights as infringing on the common law property rights that
first-party appeal was established to protect (Moran 2006).
Nonetheless, TPOAR are often associated with more participatory planning
approaches. Even though criticised on the grounds of facilitating NIMBY interests
(Orme 2010), the British Government’s policy green paper, Open Source Planning
(Conservatives 2010) recently flagged the introduction of TPOAR in Britain. While
ultimately withdrawn from Parliament (Baron 2011), the green paper fuelled significant
policy debate on the inclusion of TPOAR on the grounds of increasing local input into
development applications (Clinch 2006). Concurrently, planning systems are often
under pressure to involve the community in development decisions to improve
transparency and reduce political backlash. In Scotland, for instance, no provision for
TPOAR exists, but the prospect was still debated (and rejected) in 2003 (McLaren
2006).

3.2.3 TPOAR and political transparency
Given the discretionary, often contested, and ultimately political nature of
development approvals, TPOAR have been put forward as an important component of
good governance (Morris 2005; Willey 2006). TPOAR can provide public scrutiny and
contestation of government decisions, bringing transparency and accountability to the
exchanges between developers and the planning approval authority. This in turn
counters opportunities for corruption or the perception of corruption by the general
public (Productivity Commission 2011). For merits-based planning approval systems
to work, they must have the confidence of the general public. Morris (2005), for
example, cites the contrast between NSW, where very limited TPOAR exist, and
Victoria, where comprehensive TPOAR exist. He notes the string of findings from
ICAC (New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption) of bribes to
local government officials and representatives in NSW, compared with little evidence
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of such practice in Victoria. For Purdue (2001, pp.87–88), the case for TPOAR is
clear:
There can be little doubt that, where a local planning authority is granting
planning permission, it cannot be regarded as an independent and impartial
tribunal … it is not a question of whether third party rights of appeal need to be
introduced [in England] but rather how they should be introduced.
Countering this, appeals processes (which typically are centrally administered), can
shift the ultimate approval of development applications away from local government
and therefore away from local representation, so it arguably goes against the principle
of subsidiarity (Willey 2006). It can also lead to perverse outcomes, in particular by
effectively absolving local government of a degree of responsibility in making tough or
unpopular decisions, resulting in a ‘less responsible attitude’ in light of the appeals
safety net (G Ellis 2002, p.459). As Willey (2006) documents, there is a clear potential
for local councils to make a politically motivated decision in sensitive cases, knowing
that there will be a second round merits-based evaluation (at appeal) which will relieve
them of the responsibility to make difficult decisions (see also Finkler 2006). For
example, regarding a proposed development of 20 apartments in the inner Melbourne
suburb of Northcote that received objections from residents, Darebin Council avoided
making a decision within the statutory timeframe. Responsibility for the decision was
thereby passed to the VCAT tribunal. The council however publically ‘resolved to
inform the tribunal that it did not support the development’ (Northcote Leader, July
2011).
The use of fast-tracking has been viewed problematically in terms of political
processes in other ways. The removal of TPOAR and local assessment processes
tends to concentrate power, for example with the minister. In a study of 12–20
Nicholson Street (part of the Federal Government’s Social Housing Initiative) in
Melbourne, Le (2010) argues that despite significant achievements in terms of
housing affordability and density, the removal of TPOAR led to the consolidation of
planning power at state government level and ongoing resident dissatisfaction. Huxley
(2002) also maintains that dissatisfaction of residents in middle-ring suburbs with the
deregulatory approaches of the Maclellan era in Victoria in the 1990s, including the
Good Urban Design Guide and mandatory higher densities in residential zones, led to
the defeat of the Liberal government in the 1999 Victorian state elections. Searle
(2007) makes similar points in relation to the local government elections in NSW in
1999. Here, resident dissatisfaction and anger around mandatory medium density
housing led to the election of ‘anti-development candidates’ including a long-standing
and widely publicised stand-off between local councils on the North Shore and the
NSW Government. It is perhaps unsurprising that the Productivity Commission (2011,
p.86) sees third-party appeals as an important part of the planning process to prevent
‘scope for deals between developers and regulators’ along with enhancing amenity
and ‘community trust in the system’.

3.2.4 TPOAR and the efficiency of development approval processes
Contention surrounding TPOAR is regularly expressed as calls for procedural
efficiency in planning approval and development processes. TPOAR, it is argued,
slow down planning approval processes, and thus create inefficiency, uncertainty,
increased costs, and ultimately act as a break on investment and economic growth
(Property Council of Australia (WA Division) 2001; Whelan 2006; Productivity
Commission 2011). In the Republic of Ireland, for instance, policy debates ‘have
centred on whether the country’s existing TPOAR should be limited to enable more
rapid decision making’ (Clinch 2006, p.327). Where provisions exist for third-party
appeal rights, these are typically ‘placed under substantial pressure for reform or
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abolition’ and in 2006 the introduction of the Irish Strategic Infrastructure Bill enabled
the fast tracking of major projects (G Ellis 2006, p.331). Concern in particular focuses
on the potential for frivolous or vexatious claims (Productivity Commission 2011).
Delays caused by resident opposition to affordable and social housing have also been
linked to fast-track mechanisms at least since the 1970s (Iglesias 2003; von Hoffman
2009). In the USA, legislation such as the Fair Share (New Jersey) and Anti-Snob
(Massachusetts) acts arose in the 1970s and 1980s in response to the effects of
traditional suburban zoning on affordable housing provision. The state of New
Jersey’s Fair Share Housing Act bypasses local objections for affordable housing
projects, and was established by judicial precedent through the Mount Laurel (1975
and 1983) cases (Haar 1996). Similarly the Massachusetts Comprehensive Permit Act
(Chapter 40B) bypasses local objections where developments have an affordable
housing component. The bill has experienced consistent efforts at delay and litigation
over its history (Flint 2004; McKim 2009).
Against this, advocates of TPOAR highlight that calls for greater ‘speed’ frequently
ignore or dismiss the associated impacts on decision quality (G Ellis 2006). Indeed, G
Ellis (2004, 2006) contends that, in practice, frivolous claims are rare, and that the
characterisation of third-party appeals as being representative of only narrow selfinterest is an oversimplification not supported by empirical evidence. Further, he
suggests such arguments are more often representative of efforts to marginalise
participation in planning that frustrates or hinders government or developer objectives.

3.3

TPOAR Policy differences and trends

3.3.1 Variations in Australian states and territories
A notable feature of TPOAR is the extent to which they—and the policy assumptions
underlying them—differ. Provisions for appeal rights vary substantially between
jurisdictions and have undergone reforms in different directions at different times. In
terms of historical differences, Trenorden (2009) provides a summary of early
legislation to introduce TPOAR in Australia. Provisions for TPOAR were introduced in
1961 in Victoria (via the Town and Country Planning Act), 1966 in Queensland, 1970
in New South Wales (via section 342ZA of the Local Government Act), 1972 in South
Australia, and 1974 in Tasmania (via section 734 of the Local Government Act).
These provisions, however, have since followed diverging histories of limitations and
renegotiations. TPOAR in Australia have always been applied unevenly, and only ever
to certain land uses.
The recent history of TPOAR in Australia has been framed by the decision of state
and territory Planning Ministers to endorse the Development Assessment Framework
(DAF) (Productivity Commission 2011). The DAF is a system that streamlines
development into six assessment tracks. The first four tracks (‘exempt’, ‘prohibited’.
‘self assess’ and ‘code assess’) are defined as ‘low-risk’. ‘Exempt’ development is
defined as having a ‘low impact beyond the site and does not affect the achievement
of any policy objective’ (Productivity Commission 2011, p.80). ‘Prohibited’
development is ideally ‘identified as prohibited in the ordinance of regulatory
instrument so that both proponents and consent authorities do not waste time or effort
on proposals that will not be approved’. ‘Self assess’ is undertaken by the applicant
against a set of ‘articulated quantitative criteria’ while projects deemed ‘code assess’
are considered ‘more complex’ but nonetheless ‘considered against objective criteria
and performance standards’. These first four tracks attract no TPOAR.
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The last two tracks (‘merit assess’ and ‘impact assess’) reflect detailed and often
complicated development applications with significant impacts beyond the site. In the
DAF model, both merit assess and code assess include TPOAR.
Despite national commitment to DAF, the Productivity Commission (2011) reports
significant variations in its application. As shown in Table 1 below, Victoria and
Tasmania now have the broadest access to TPOAR, although The Victorian
Government is currently considering the introduction of a ‘code assess’ stream.
Western Australia, by contrast, does not allow third-party appeals, although this
prospect was debated in the early 2000s (Trenorden 2009; Property Council of
Australia, WA Division 2001). In NSW and SA third-party appeal rights are limited and
only available for certain types of development such as farming, mining and polluting
industries. However, Queensland and the ACT follow the DAF model with third-party
appeals limited to the more complex ‘merit assess’ or ‘impact assess’ streams.
Table 1: Variations in Provisions for TPOAR in Australian states and territories

Location

Third-party objection and appeal rights

NSW

Limited to uses such as farming, mining and polluting industries.

Victoria

Broad. With the exception of single unit dwellings and some
zones and overlays, assessment pathways in Victoria currently
permit TPOAR.

Queensland

Limited. DAF based—limited to ‘merit assess’ and ‘impact
assess’ developments.

WA

None.

SA

Limited to ‘category 3’ developments. Commensurable with
‘merit assess’ in DAF.

Tasmania

Broad.

ACT

Limited. DAF based—limited to ‘merit assess’ and ‘impact
assess’ developments.

NT

Limited. Commensurable with DAF. Limited to developments in
residential zones, in limited circumstances.

Source: Productivity Commission 2011; Trenorden 2009; G Ellis 2002; Clinch 2006

In its review of Development Assessment Performance in 2008–09, the Local
Government and Planning Ministers’ Council (2009) reported considerable variation in
the percentages of development applications subject to appeals. While these data
relate to both third and first-party appeals, they appear to reflect the extent of TPOAR
in each state. For instance, 7 per cent of development applications in Victoria were
subject to appeal (first or third-party). This was in contrast with Tasmania (3.7%), ACT
(3%), WA (2.7%), NSW (1.3%), NT (0.86%) and SA (0.82%).

3.3.2

Recent policy trends and debates

Although there is variation in the coverage and style of TPOAR across jurisdictions,
three key policy trends around TPOAR can be identified in contemporary policy
debates in Australia.
First is the pressure to improve the public accountability and transparency of planning
decisions. Planning and public participation models exist in a politicised context. One
in which there is often intense scrutiny of controversial decisions. Along with the
defence of existing TPOAR in planning systems discussed previously, there are
moves in some jurisdictions toward providing—or at least, being seen as providing—
more opportunities for local engagement to increase confidence of the general public
in planning. Interviews in 24 of Australia’s largest cities and towns commissioned by
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the Productivity Commission (2011) indicated widespread support by local councils for
third-party objection and appeal rights. This was matched in some cities with strong
support among residents for TPOAR.
Second, there is the counter trend towards the removal of opportunities for third-party
objection and appeal rights. This is often referred to as ‘fast-tracking’ and is a key part
of recent policy debates around TPOAR. In contexts where appeal rights exist in
principle, they may still be excluded or ‘tracked’ for particular types of developments.
A true fast tracking mechanism is where a particular circumstance triggers a particular
process with regards to provisions for objection and appeal. Third-party appeals are
most commonly excluded where developments are very minor; or at the other end of
the scale, for major developments of state significance (Productivity Commission
2011).
In Australia, most states and territories allow for major projects to be ‘called in’ for
assessment by the state Planning Minister. Victoria and South Australia had the
largest number of proposals called in (assessed at the state level). Notably, Western
Australia (the state with no TPOAR) has no provisions for ministerial call-ins. The
impacts of exemptions from TPOAR on housing supply are little understood or studied
and the process of streamlining can be contentious. Recent reforms to planning
include curtailment of appeal rights in the ACT and the expansion of state-level
planning decisions in Victoria and Western Australia. Although having broad TPOAR,
Victoria has introduced policies (e.g. ‘Better Decisions Faster’ and ‘Cutting Red Tape
in Planning’) to fast-track or use ministerial powers to allow certain developments to
bypass local objection rights. The Planning Minister in Victoria has significant control
of planning schemes and decisions.
Moreover, use of Ministerial call-in powers for major projects in Victoria and other
states and territories under the Nation Building Economic Stimulus Plan show a
willingness to ‘roll out’ planning approaches that bypass formal objection and appeal
on account of housing supply concerns (see Federal Government Social Housing
Initiative; Housing Affordability Fund; Housing Supply Council; and COAG Housing
Supply and Affordability Reform Agenda). In Australia, social and to some extent
affordable housing is a development type typically fast tracked to purposefully avoid
TPOAR.
Third, there is a trend toward the minimisation (but not removal) of opportunities for
objection and appeal. Recent inquiries into development approval processes, such as
the 2010 Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission Inquiry into Streamlining
Local Government Regulation, have flagged potential reforms that maintain TPOAR
but limit the scope of development applications to which they apply. Current inquiries
into development approval processes (including the 2011 Productivity Commission
Review of Planning, Zoning and Development Assessments and the 2010 Victorian
Competition and Efficiency Commission Inquiry into Streamlining Local Government
Regulation) flag potential reforms to TPOAR. The Victorian Government, in line with
COAG recommendations, is currently reviewing and updating the Planning and
Environment Act 1987. The review ‘will identify opportunities to introduce the code
assess track for certain planning permit matters, and a new process for assessment of
state significant development’ (Productivity Commission 2011, p.90). New residential
zones are also proposed for the state to replace the commonly used Residential 1
zone (which currently includes broad TPOAR against higher density housing). In the
meantime zoning changes, wherein the applicable zone bypasses TPOAR, are also
popular fast-tracking mechanisms in Victoria. Nationally, housing supply initiatives,
including the Housing Affordability Fund, Housing Supply Council, and the COAG
Housing Supply and Affordability Reform Agenda, have implications for TPOAR.
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The full extent of TPOAR under the DAF model will vary according to the designation
of development in different tracks. Development designated as code-assess and selfassess are not likely to attract TPOAR. Of central concern for all states as they move
to the DAF model is that the assessment track should ‘correspond with the level of
risk/impact and thus the level of assessment attention required to make an
appropriately informed decision’ (Productivity Commission 2011, p.276). Ultimately, as
a ‘middle way’ between full TPOAR and ‘fast-tracking’, DAF preserves appeal rights in
only some cases, where projects are deemed to have a significant impact or level of
technical complexity:
Opportunities for third-party appeals should not be provided where
applications are wholly assessed against objective rules and tests.
Opportunities for third-party appeals may be provided in limited other cases.
(Productivity Commission 2011, p.80)

3.4

Gaps in the evidence-base

Within the context of DAF, the place of TPOAR is in the balance. Most jurisdictions in
Australia are moving towards more streamlined processes, while support for thirdparty rights continues. Best practice suggests high-risk or high-impact development
should incorporate participatory planning approaches, including TPOAR. However,
this raises new questions about HDH: On what grounds might HDH be considered
high-risk or high-impact? From this, what level of TPOAR should HDH attract? As the
turn in Australian planning towards in-fill development comes face to face with
resident opposition to HDH and the place of third-party rights moves centre-stage in
international arenas, three key gaps in our understanding of the relationship between
third parties, appeal and HDH are emerging.
First, to what extent are third parties using TPOAR to resist HDH and what are the
impacts on housing approvals? A cursory review of local media suggests that HDH is
fiercely contested by residents and activists in some middle ring suburbs in Melbourne
and Sydney. Case studies documenting highly conflicted sites have been undertaken
(Huxley 2002; Dovey et al. 2009) and interviews with developers suggest a perception
that in-fill development is more expensive due to objection and appeal processes
(Kelly et al. 2011; Goodman et al. 2010). However, we have no data at the
metropolitan scale showing whether and to what extent, third-party objectors and
appeal applicants are targeting, or are permitted to target HDH. In order to fully
assess the extent to which TPOAR inhibit HDH, a metropolitan wide analysis of thirdparty appeals data, along with an in-depth analysis of the impact of appeals on
housing supply time-lines is urgently required.
Second, to what extent are third-party objection and appeal rights accessible by all
members of the public? And to what extent are streamlined approaches distributed
evenly across the metropolitan area? The removal of TPOAR where they previously
existed is a withdrawal of citizens’ rights. However, across a small number of studies
(Huxley 2002, Woodcock et al. 2011), there is some evidence that those most likely to
access TPOAR are also those living in localities with the highest socio-economic
profiles. At the same time, there are already numerous mechanisms through which a
myriad of different development styles―including HDH―are exempt from TPOAR
and to date, there has been no analysis of the distribution of the removal of rights.
Both these gaps pose significant challenges with regard to planning reforms around
TPOAR. In particular, without data showing the current distribution of, and access to
TPOAR, planning reforms potentially risk replicating or reinforcing exclusionary
trends.
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Third, from the perspective of those stakeholders who have experienced TPOAR, how
effective are objection and appeal processes? One of the limits of objection and
appeal processes is that they do not provide an opportunity for third parties to
articulate or present an alternative vision of how development might proceed
(Trenorden 2009). At the same time, even though there is growing consensus across
planning literature that early consultation can help mediate planning conflicts
(Albrechts 2004; Productivity Commission 2011), we have little indication of whether
earlier phases of public engagement shape intentions of objectors to appeal or not; or
whether appeal processes limit or fuel intentions to mobilise in other ways (for
instance through local, state or federal elections). There is also little data recording
the views of planning authorities and developers about their experience of appeal
processes compared to streamlined projects.
These gaps in our understanding of TPOAR provide an important framework for our
research. The answers to these questions will help anchor a policy debate focused on
streamlining development approval, to the question of HDH specifically. The research
will also explore the extent to which participatory aims are achieved and for the first
time, establish the views of those stakeholders working with TPOAR and fast-track
planning approaches in the context of HDH. Central to these questions is an allimportant scoping exercise around the variations in TPOAR in the planning system.
The complex framework of where and how higher density housing is or is not subject
to TPOAR in Victoria is reviewed in the next chapter. This then informs the design of
the empirical component of our study.
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4

POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR TPOAR AND
HOUSING IN VICTORIA

Victoria presents an ideal case study for the research because the planning system
uniquely combines strong third-party appeal rights with a wide range of streamlined
approaches. Normal third-party appeal rights in the state’s planning system are
unusually strong. However, at the same time the use of fast-tracking mechanisms—
including ministerial call-in powers, zones and overlays—has been significant
(Productivity Commission 2011). Special provisions bypassing normal notice and
review requirements—both within planning schemes and via call-ins by and referrals
to the Minister for Planning—appear to have been commonly used to create
alternative development approval mechanisms in Victoria, particularly for large
projects and (recently) for social housing. The number of appeals before the Victorian
Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) is high and the appeal process is widely
perceived as being more biased toward the approval of higher density projects than
are local council assessments (Woodcock et al. 2011). This situation allows the
analysis of variations in development approval processes, appeal cases and planning
system outcomes.
This chapter summarises the relevant policy framework governing third-party appeals
and fast tracking mechanisms in Victoria, as they relate to higher density housing and
social housing. Definitions of medium and high density housing are contested. For the
purposes of the research, the term higher density housing (HDH) is used to refer to
multi-unit dwelling with a particular focus on development comprising more than ten
dwellings. Identification of HDH projects is based in part on common planning permit
triggers in the Victorian planning system. This is discussed in more detail in the next
chapter.
Summarising the relevant policy framework for HDH is an important step in framing
and informing our research design, particularly for the quantitative data collection.
Fast tracking tends to be used in an ad-hoc way in response to major development
proposals. This means that there is little existing information bringing together the
policy framework and its potential relationships to housing supply. Development of the
summary below has occurred alongside initial data collection for the quantitative
research.

4.1

Provisions for TPOAR on housing

4.1.1 Normal third-party notice, objection and appeal rights
Normal notice, decision and review requirements for planning permits in Victoria are
set out in Sections 52, 64 and 82 of the Planning and Environment Act (the Act). As
set out in the Act, the planning permit process requires general public notification
(such as signage or newspaper notifications), as well as the direct notification of any
affected parties. Public notifications and objections form a part of the permit
application process. The TPOAR system means that any interested person may
object to a permit application. The authority is bound to consider the objections, but
receiving objections does not mean that the responsible authority will not approve an
application. Decisions on permit applications may be appealed at VCAT.

4.1.2 Zoning and planning permits
In Victoria planning permits are required for certain uses and developments,
dependent on the zoning of the land. Each zone stipulates uses as either ‘as of right’
(permit not required), permit required (use allowable with a planning permit), and
prohibited. There is a high share of discretionary (permitted subject to permit) uses.
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Under the Victoria Planning Provisions (VPPs), local authorities apply standard zones
and overlays selected from a list set by the state government. Local planning scheme
content must be approved at the state level. The decision-making process established
by the VPPs is comparatively flexible, with a high share of discretionary uses.
Planning permit applications are dealt with in the first instance by the responsible
authority, which is in most cases the local council.
The most prevalent zoning for housing, the Residential 1 Zone, does not require a
planning permit for single dwellings. A permit is required, however, for any land
subdivision, construction of a multi-residential building (meaning apartments or highdensity housing), or construction of more than one dwelling on a lot (meaning dualoccupancy, infill or medium-density housing). In most residential zones, medium- and
high-density housing is typically neither prohibited nor allowed as of right, but requires
a planning permit.
Some planning overlays apply additional permit triggers to land. These include
heritage controls, neighbourhood character controls and special landscape controls.
Under a planning overlay, permits are typically required to demolish or remove a
building, to remove vegetation or to undertake most external works. Planning permits
and building permits are related, but represent different (overlapping) processes.
Building permits are required for most building and construction work over a certain
value, regardless of whether a planning permit is also required. All new dwellings
require a building permit, and the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) uses
residential building permits as an indicator of new residential building activity. There
are no third-party objection or appeal rights on building permits.
Not all new dwellings require a planning permit, but where a planning permit is
required there are typically third-party appeal rights on the decision to grant a permit.
Some zones and overlays require permits for higher density housing but also apply
exemptions from normal TPOAR, either for all applications or for specified
circumstances. The end result is a complex array of differing requirements and
exemptions for permits and for TPOAR on housing developments—which are set out
in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Zoning and housing in Melbourne: permit and TPOAR requirements

Zone / Overlay

Category

Permit and TPOAR requirements

Residential 1 zone

Normal
TPOAR

Single dwellings do not require permits. Medium and
higher density dwellings require permits and have
normal TPOAR. The most common zone for residential
areas.

Mixed Use Zone

Normal
TPOAR

Allows a range of residential and other uses. Single
dwellings do not require permits. Medium and higher
density dwellings require permits and have normal
TPOAR. Exemption from TPOAR on subdivisions.

Residential 2 zone

Fast tracked
TPOAR

Single dwellings do not require permits. Medium and
higher density dwellings require permits, but do not
have normal TPOAR. Meant to encourage higher
densities, however not commonly used.

Residential 3 zone

Normal
TPOAR

Single dwellings do not require permits. Medium and
higher density dwellings require permits and have
normal TPOAR. Similar to the more common
Residential 1 zone but with more restrictive design
requirements.
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Zone / Overlay

Category

Permit and TPOAR requirements

Comprehensive
Development Zone

Fast tracked
TPOAR

Schedules to the zone may (and commonly do) specify
exemption from TPOAR.

Priority
Development Zone

Fast tracked
TPOAR

Schedules to the zone may (and commonly do) specify
exemption from TPOAR.

Capital City Zone

Fast tracked
TPOAR

Applies in the Melbourne CBD area. Larger
developments are assessed by the Minister for Planning
and are exempt from TPOAR.

Docklands Zone

Fast tracked
TPOAR

Applies only in the Docklands precinct. Most are
assessed by the Minister for Planning and are exempt
from normal TPOAR.

Business Zones

Reduced
TPOAR

Applications require permits but are exempt from
TPOAR. TPOAR only triggered where applications are
within 30m of a residential zone, land used for a
hospital, or an education centre.

Urban Growth
Zone

Fast tracked
TPOAR

Applications do not require permits where generally in
accordance with an approved structure plan. Exempt
from TPOAR unless specified in the schedule.

Activity Centre
Zone

TPOAR
subject to
specific
circumstances

Exemptions on TPOAR may be applied in the schedule
to the zone.

Incorporated Plan
Overlay

Fast tracked
TPOAR

Permits required but are exempt from TPOAR if
‘generally in accordance with the incorporated plan’.

Development Plan
Overlay

Fast tracked
TPOAR

Permits required but are exempt from TPOAR if
‘generally in accordance with the plan’.

Design and
Development
Overlay

TPOAR
subject to
specific
circumstances

Allows for specific design requirements to be included in
permit assessment. Mixed effect: may introduce
additional requirements, or may specify in the schedule
that the site is exempt from TPOAR.

Heritage Overlay

Additional
permit triggers

Applies additional controls to areas of heritage value.
Demolition, construction, and many buildings and works
require permits and have normal TPOAR.

Neighbourhood
Character Overlay

Additional
permit triggers

Applies additional controls to areas of amenity value.
Demolition, construction, and many buildings and works
require permits and have normal TPOAR.

4.1.3 VCAT appeals
Under the normal requirements set out in the Act, if an authority grants a planning
permit, the objectors (third parties) have the right to appeal the decision at VCAT. If
the authority refuses a permit or places conditions upon it, the applicant (first party)
has the right to appeal the decision at VCAT. VCAT is an independent tribunal that
presides over dispute resolutions, including those relating to the planning decisions of
local authorities that are not resolved to the satisfaction of either planning permit
applicants or of objectors. VCAT has the power to uphold, vary, set aside or substitute
the decision of local authorities on planning cases. Cases are determined on merit,
including consistency with state planning policy. Except on points of law, there are no
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appeal rights on VCAT decisions. The types of planning dispute cases heard under
the planning list include:
 Applications by objectors about the decision of the authority to grant a planning

permit.
 Applications by permit applicants about the decision of the authority to refuse to

grant a planning permit.
 Applications by permit applicants about the decision of the authority to impose

conditions on a planning permit.
 Applications by permit applicants about the failure of the authority to decide on a

planning application within the statutory time frame.
Where a planning permit is required for use or development, there are two basic
possible outcomes: the development is approved, or the development is not
approved. The development may be approved or not approved by the responsible
authority or by VCAT; or it may be ‘called-in’ at either stage (during council
assessments or at VCAT) by the Minister for Planning (see below). The following are
the most common paths by which a permit application may result in a VCAT dispute
(and be ultimately approved or rejected at VCAT):
1. There are no objections lodged but the local authority rejects the planning permit
application. The applicants lodge a VCAT appeal against this decision (a firstparty or refusal case).
2. There are objections lodged and the local authority rejects the planning permit
application. The applicants lodge a VCAT appeal against this decision (also a firstparty or refusal case).
3. There are objections lodged and the local authority approves the planning permit
application. The objectors lodge a VCAT appeal against this decision (a third-party
or objection case).
4. The planning authority (council) fails to make a decision on the application within
the statutory timeframe (a failure to determine case).

4.1.4 Fast tracking mechanisms
Medium or higher density dwelling developments can be fast tracked through the
Victorian planning system to avoid the normal TPOAR provisions specifying notice,
decision and appeal requirements. The measures to bypass TPOAR take four basic
forms. Three of these are based on changes to the local planning schemes, and one
involves specific planning applications. These four basic types of fast tracking are
detailed below.
First, fast tracking via the application of fast tracking zones in the planning scheme.
Zoning can specify that a use does not require a planning permit. As discussed
above, in all normal residential zones, this applies to detached housing on a single lot.
Medium or higher density housing developments (residential buildings, more than one
dwelling on a lot, small lot sizes) nearly always require a planning permit. Some zones
specify, however, that applications are exempt from notice and appeal requirements.
Applications are then assessed against design guidelines. Zones may also specify
that all applications in the zone are exempt from normal TPOAR. Zoning that typically
remove TPOAR on higher density housing in Victoria are as follows:
 Priority Development Zone
 Comprehensive Development Zone
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 Docklands Zone
 Capital City Zones
 Residential 2 Zone.

Importantly, most residential areas in Melbourne are zoned Residential 1, with normal
TPOAR. The Priority Development Zone is sometimes used for designated Activity
Centres, for example transit oriented development in Footscray, and for projects of
‘regional or state significance’. That the central city areas (Melbourne CBD and
Docklands areas), where most high rise development in the city has occurred, are
exempt from TPOAR is notable and will be explored in more detail in the quantitative
component of the research.
Second, fast tracking via the application of overlays in the planning scheme. Overlays
specify further conditions to inform development application assessments. Some
overlays apply further restrictions on the nature of allowable development, often
increasing the range of permit triggers (for example, the heritage overlay). However,
other overlays effectively streamline development applications by exempting TPOAR
on applications generally in accordance with an overall plan for the site (Incorporated
Plan Overlay, Development Plan Overlay). The Design and Development Overlay has
a mixed potential effect on TPOAR in that it may specify TPOAR exemptions in the
schedule to the overlay, but may also apply additional design requirements.
Third, fast tracking via changes to the planning scheme that makes the Minister for
Planning the responsible authority for particular sites or developments. Under the Act,
the Minister for Planning may become the responsible authority for particular sites or
development types, by modifying the applicable planning scheme or schemes at
Section 61.01. Sections 61.01 of municipal planning schemes in Victoria specify the
responsible authority for the scheme, including specific sites or developments for
which the Minister for Planning is the responsible authority. The Minister for Planning
as the responsible authority means that development applications are exempt from
normal notice and review requirements. These changes are typically used for major
development sites or for social housing redevelopment sites. Normally the Minister will
amend the planning scheme directly. These changes are gazetted but do not have to
follow from consultations with council or the public. Applications for these sites are
assessed by the Minister and, as a result, bypass normal TPOAR.
Similar but special provisions have been made for social housing built through the
Nation Building Stimulus package 2008–12. An amendment to Clause 52.41 of all
planning schemes made applications for designated social housing both exempt from
TPOAR, and assessed by the Minister for Planning. This provision will expire in June
2012.
Fourth, fast tracking via ministerial call-ins and deferrals of planning applications. The
Minister for Planning may also become the responsible authority for a specific
planning application—this is commonly known as ‘calling in’ an application. This
typically occurs where applications are considered to be of state significance or are
attracting controversy. The applications may be called in at any stage of development
assessment, including when an application proceeds to VCAT. In addition, an
applicant or council may request to defer an application to the Minister for Planning.
Typically the applications are then considered by panels appointed by Planning
Panels Victoria, including the Priority Development Panel. The use of ministerial callin powers has been significant and controversial in Victoria.
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4.2

Summary

The above review has highlighted that TPOAR are strong in Victoria and apply, in
most areas, to all medium and higher density housing developments. In most
residential areas, the applicant must apply for a permit from the local authority and the
local authority is required to undertake public notification. Third parties may object to
an application and can take the case to VCAT to appeal if the council approves the
application.
However, the review has also highlighted that exemptions to these normal TPOAR are
widespread and take a variety of forms—each with implications for housing
development. Special zones applying to many areas of intense development—
including the CBD and Docklands—are exempt from TPOAR. Overlays removing
TPOAR on applications are applied to many major sites and precincts. The Minister
for Planning has strong powers under the legislation and can assess sites or
applications without provisions for review or appeal. These provisions for bypassing
TPOAR are set out in Table 3 below. This provides an important framing for the
research design described in the next chapter.
Table 3: Fast tracking planning mechanisms for housing in Victoria

Broad type

Specific

Content

Zoning

Priority Development
Zone

Schedules to the zone may specify exemption from
notice, decision and review requirements of the act,
typically where applications are deemed in accordance
with an approved local area plan.

Comprehensive
Development Zone

Schedules to the zone may specify exemption from
notice, decisions and review requirements of the act,
typically where applications are deemed in accordance
with an approved local area plan.

Residential 2 Zone

Applications for medium and high density housing are
exempt from normal notice, decision and review
requirements, where consistent with design guidelines.

Business Zones 1, 2
and 5

Exempt from TPOAR unless within 30m of a
residential zone, education facility or hospital.

Incorporated Plan
Overlay, Development
Plan Overlay

Applications exempt from TPOAR if generally in
accordance with an overall site plan.

Design and
Development Overlay

Schedule may specify that applications are exempt
from TPOAR if in accordance with design guidelines.

Responsible
authority—
planning
scheme

Clause 61.01 of the
planning scheme

The scheme can specify that the Minister is the
responsible authority for specific sites, precincts or
development types. The Minister is not required to
follow normal TPOAR process processes.

Responsible
authority—callins, deferrals
and panels

Called-in projects

The Minister may call in permit applications for
assessment. The Minister is not required to follow
normal TPOAR processes.

Deferred projects

The council may request that an application be
assessed by the Minister or a panel appointed by the
Minister.

Nation Building
Stimulus Projects

Clause 52.41 added to planning schemes makes
social housing projects under the nation building
program exempt from TPOAR. The Minister for
Planning is the responsible authority. Expires June
2012.

Overlays
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5

EMPIRICAL COMPONENT OF THE STUDY

Our study aims to situate HDH in wider debates related to streamlining TPOAR in
development assessment processes. It is particularly interested in documenting the
impact of TPOAR compared to fast-track planning approaches on housing supply.
However, it is also concerned with the policy challenge of mediating community
opposition to HDH while maintaining participatory planning goals. To these ends, the
project examines two basic models of public engagement in planning approval
processes—approval processes where third-party objection and appeal rights
(TPOAR) exist, and fast tracked planning approval processes that bypass these
rights. In order to explore both a breadth of data documenting impacts on both
housing supply and participatory planning aims at the metropolitan scale, as well as
detailed data documenting the ways that TPOAR intersect with housing supply across
the whole of the planning and development process, along with the perceptions of key
stakeholders regarding the effectiveness of TPOAR, the project uses a mixed
methods approach. It comprises quantitative and qualitative phases.

5.1

Quantitative research design

Our quantitative design is based on the policy framework for higher density and social
housing developments in Victoria, as set out in the preceding chapter. For the
purposes of the research, the definition of higher density housing is based on permit
triggers in the Victorian system. Proposals to construct residential buildings
(apartment buildings), more than one dwelling on a lot, and dwellings on very small
lots, normally require planning permission. Within this scope we explore variations in
provisions for TPOAR. As described above, although there are broad provisions for
TPOAR on HDH, there are a range of exemptions that bypass TPOAR in different
circumstances. For the purposes of the research, social housing is limited to the
provisions of the Nation Building social housing project—government funded housing
projects endorsed by the Office of Housing.
We are constructing a dataset specifically for the project, which consists of data from
a range of sources merged together to form a database of planning activity in Victoria
2009–10. This dataset will form a major component of our empirical research. The
dataset will be analysed to profile the extent to which there are variations across
regions in the way planning appeals and fast tracking processes occur where they
concern residential planning permit applications. Two types of measurements will be
examined. These comprise overall figures on residential planning permit applications
and, for larger developments (with 10 or more dwellings) where additional details are
known, dwelling numbers by type and density.
The numbers of permit applications and dwellings built through different planning
streams in Victoria will be compared. Most of the analysis will be at the level of
individual housing projects that move through different pathways of planning
permissions in Victoria, with different TPOAR implications.
Within the context of residential development requiring planning permission (defined
in the previous chapter), we will compare housing activity in three basic pathways
through the planning system that we have identified:
1. Unrestricted TPOAR available; the planning application did not go to VCAT.
2. Unrestricted TPOAR available; the application proceeded to appeal at VCAT.
3. No TPOAR available (‘fast tracked’ based on a number of possible criteria, as set
out in the preceding chapter).
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5.1.1 Scope
The scope for the analysis is housing projects in Melbourne municipalities that were
active in the planning system at any point during 2009 and 2010 by:
 applying for a planning permit
 lodging a VCAT appeal
 applying for ministerial project status, or
 already being listed within the planning process in the above ways.

The developments will be coded into three basic types:
 no or limited TPOAR available
 unrestricted TPOAR available; planning application did not go to VCAT
 unrestricted TPOAR available, and application proceeded to appeal at VCAT (and

if so which type of appeal).
Basic measures will be reported for all residential permit applications in scope. More
detailed information is available for the following cases. For these major
developments, additional measures will be reported including density and dwelling
numbers:
 housing projects in established areas of Melbourne involving 10+ dwellings
 defined by DPCD’s Urban Development Program (UDP)
 submitted or in the planning system in 2009 and 2010.

5.1.2 Data sources
To build the dataset of housing projects and TPOAR streams, the following are being
collated:
 Planning permit activity for residential projects based on Planning Permit Activity

Reporting Project (PPARs) data sourced from the Department of Planning and
Community Development (DPCD).
 Detailed planning permit activity for major residential projects (10+ dwellings)

sourced from the DPCD Urban Development Program (UDP) for 2009 and 2010.
 Planning scheme data on zoning and on responsible authorities applicable to each

municipality in and abutting Melbourne, sourced from Victorian Planning Schemes
Online.
 ‘Call-in lists’: lists of planning permit applications considered by the Minister for

Planning and Priority Development Panel.
 VCAT planning list appeals data.

The PPARs data provides a base case of residential permit activity for the
investigation period. PPARs data provides indicators of the local planning outcome,
the number of objections received, and the type and outcome of VCAT cases. PPARs
data is at the application level, and may include multiple applications per site. The
UDP data provides more detailed information on development activity for major sites
(10+ dwellings) during the investigation period. This includes density, form, dwelling
numbers, and site history. The UDP data is the development level.
Both the PPARs and UDP data sources provide key information on planning process;
however, they do not contain enough detail to enable full analysis of the impact of
TPOAR and ‘fast-tracking’ on housing supply. Synthesis of these data sources with an
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analysis of planning scheme provisions (zones, overlays, schedules), ministerial call
ins, and VCAT appeals will enable a more detailed picture of the impact of TPOAR
and ‘fast-tracking’ on housing supply to be presented.

5.1.3 Compilation of dataset
The first step for the quantitative method is to compile the base list of permit
applications and housing projects that fit within the scope above. This list is based on
planning permit and Urban Development Program (UDP) data published by DPCD, as
described above.
There are two streams to the UDP: major residential (10+ dwellings in urban areas),
and broad hectare (Greenfield) developments. The UDP data is based on planning
permit records and on consultations with local councils. A spatial join will be
undertaken to link the PPARs to UDP data. Residential permit applications will then
be coded into those relating to major development sites (for which additional
information is available), and other (usually smaller) applications. Multiple permit
applications for the same site will be identified. Projects not meeting the scope of our
project will be eliminated. For example, those that applied for planning permission
after 2010 will be removed.
From this list of housing projects we will then code those projects into ‘fast tracked’
and ‘appealed’ categories if applicable. To identify fast tracked projects, the zoning
and overlays applicable to each project will be identified and coded by whether normal
TPOAR does or does not apply for that particular zone and municipality. Housing
projects found in the Minister’s planning permit register will be matched to the base
list. This process will identify applications for which the Minister is the responsible
authority and where normal TPOAR will not apply. This includes Nation Building social
housing projects; called-in applications; and projects in many fast tracked zones such
as the Capital City and Priority Development Zones. The applicability and type of fast
tracking will be coded onto the list of housing projects in scope.
Finally, housing projects that proceeded to a VCAT appeal will be identified. This will
be based in part on information in the PPARs and UDP data, supplemented with
VCAT case lists and media coverage to determine the type of VCAT appeal (firstparty, third-party, failure to determine). Ultimately, for each housing project in scope,
the following information will be collected (where applicable) and attached to the base
list of housing projects:
 The number of dwelling units proposed (major sites only).
 Site density (major sites only).
 The applicable zoning and overlays.
 The responsible authority.
 Whether appeal rights available, and if not then which type of fast track process

(zoning, overlays, ministerial authority).
 Location characteristics (derived from geocoding the projects to specific sites).
 Outcome of application: approved/not approved.
 Level of objections received.
 Level of informal opposition (whether community groups were involved).

5.1.4 Analytical methods
Once the dataset is finalised, there will be three basic components to the quantitative
analysis, as follows:
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1. descriptive analysis
2. modelling
3. validation against aggregate data.
The descriptive analysis will look at variations in the number and rate (relative to
permit applications and total dwellings) of VCAT appeals and fast tracked projects for
residential developments across Melbourne municipalities over 2009 to 2010. This
first stage of the analysis will describe geographical variation in the following:
1. Planning permit activity for housing (overall numbers, differences between major
and other sites).
2. Volumes of dwellings by type and density.
3. Objections, VCAT appeals and outcomes (numbers, percentages, differences
between major and other sites).
4. The use of different fast tracking mechanisms for housing (zoning, overlays,
ministerial authority, Nation Building social housing).
The analysis will compare the policy implications of spatial variations in planning
permits, objections, appeals, and streamlining processes for new housing. The extent
to which more projects are approved (or built) through fast tracking means will be
compared. For major developments, variations in the type and density of housing will
be explored.
The second part of the quantitative analysis will use correlation and regression
techniques to link the descriptive analyses to additional data describing the following:
1. Local housing market indicators.
2. The socio-economic distribution of participative planning measures (using Socio
Economic Indicators for Australia (SEIFA) and other measures).
Modelling techniques will be used to test the extent to which planning processes are
equally distributed across different housing market conditions and socio-economic
profiles. The analysis will explore factors influencing planning streams and outcomes
for housing projects. This will enable us to consider the extent to which different
planning system outcomes are equally distributed across the city; and the extent to
which planning streams and outcomes are driven by the nature of projects or of local
areas. The use of local housing market indicators will explore the influence of housing
prices. The use of the SEIFA indexes will explore the influence of local resident
characteristics—addressing the issue of whether appeals are more common in areas
of higher economic power. The SEIFA indexes provide small area measures of socio
economic factors including income, education, tenure, and occupation.
Finally the findings will be validated against other aggregate data for Melbourne over
the study period. These data sources comprise:
 ABS Building Approvals
 UDP data on broad hectare housing
 Planning Permits Activity Report (PPAR) reports

The building approvals data will be particularly important as it will highlight the
differences between all residential developments in the city, as compared to the
medium and higher density housing requiring planning permits. As reviewed in the
previous chapter, low density housing typically does not require a planning permit in
Victoria. This means that although the dataset compiled for the study, and the core
analyses proposed, will capture variations within different planning processes for
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housing, a large part of housing is likely to be built outside the planning system. A
number of studies have suggested that there are barriers to urban consolidation as a
result of simpler development processes for low density housing in greenfield areas.
This stage of the analysis will therefore put the role of TPOAR, appeals, and fast
tracking of development, into the context of the overall scale and characteristics of
residential development in the city.
Together these quantitative data will make significant inroads into our understanding
of the impact of TPOAR and streamlined approaches in terms of housing supply and
participatory planning aims.

5.2

Qualitative case studies

Three qualitative case studies of higher density development in Melbourne will build
on quantitative work in two key ways. First, as set out in Table 4 below, by deepening
analysis of the impacts of TPOAR compared to fast track approaches on housing
supply and second, by providing a set of qualitative data documenting stakeholder
perceptions of the effectiveness of TPOAR and fast track approaches from different
perspectives.
a)

Establishing the impact of TPOAR and fast track approaches in terms of delay in
housing supply across the life of the project. The case studies will build on the
quantitative work by developing a detailed, whole-of-project account of the impact
of TPOAR/fast track on housing supply timelines. Project timelines will be
established for each case from initial engagement of proponents through to
construction. Even though it is assumed that third-party objection and appeal
processes add delays to housing development, this project will quantify and
specify these delays in each case study. The case studies will not only capture
the complexities and interruptions that characterise and shape housing supply
(Ball et al. 2009) but develop an understanding of housing supply that
incorporates and acknowledges deliberative aspects of the planning process.

b) Stakeholder perceptions of the planning process. Through in-depth interviews
with residents, planners and developers associated with each of the case studies,
qualitative data will provide a clearer sense of the effectiveness of TPOAR
compared to fast track approaches from stakeholder perspectives. Specifically
qualitative data will explore whether TPOAR and fast track approaches dilute or
fuel new types of mobilisation against HDH and social housing; whether earlier
phases of community consultation shape residents’ decisions to object or appeal
development approvals; whether and how TPOAR and fast track approaches
shape developer intentions to develop in-fill sites; and how planners’ experiences
of TPOAR and fast track approaches shape their approach to future projects.
Critically, they will provide an opportunity for all stakeholders to reflect on
alternative approaches.
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Table 4: Impacts of TPOAR/fast track investigated in quantitative and qualitative
research design

Phase of
research

Housing supply

Participatory
planning goals

Quantitative

 Number and per cent of
applications and dwellings
subject to appeal rights by
dwelling type.

Variations in
distribution of
appeal rights and
appeal outcomes
by locality, SEIFA
and housing market
characteristics.

 Variations in appeal rights.
 Variations in objections
and appeal by location
and by dwelling type.
Qualitative

Impact of appeal/streamlining
on housing supply from initial
permit application to
construction.

Perceptions of
planning

 Stakeholder
perceptions of the
effectiveness of
TPOAR/fast-track.
 Likelihood of further
mobilisation.
 Alternative forms of
participation
(including earlier
engagement).

5.2.1 Selection of cases
In order to draw comparisons between different levels of TPOAR in terms of housing
supply and stakeholder perceptions of the planning process, case studies will
compare one fast tracked example (Case A) with two cases where full TPOAR are
available (Case B and Case C). Case A will be a site developed as part of the Social
Housing Initiative where TPOAR were bypassed. Case B and Case C will have full
appeal rights. To enable comparison of the impact of TPOAR/streamlining on housing
supply timeline, Case A and Case B will comprise approximately the same number of
dwellings. To explore the extent to which early consultation and agreement of
planning outcomes shape decisions to appeal planning approvals, Case B or C will be
selected from a sample where the appeal was preceded by an earlier phase of
consultation. For instance, the case may occur in a location characterised by
strategic-level consultation through a structure planning process, zone amendment,
precinct plan or similar prior to appeal. In addition, in order to generate a whole-ofproject account of the impact of TPOAR/fast track on housing-supply timelines, all
three cases will be at or near construction.
The selection of the three case studies will be aided significantly by quantitative
analysis. Specifically, planning approvals data by planning stream, objections data,
appeals outcomes and number of dwellings will be used to develop a shortlist of
potential sites. Location will also play a role with at least one case drawn from the
middle suburbs where higher density development and resident action is becoming
increasingly significant.

5.2.2 Case materials
The case studies will be developed with clear reference to planning policy frameworks
and histories of prior consultation surrounding each site. The case studies will also
draw significantly on semi-structured interviews with resident opposition groups,
developers and planners along with media analysis and site observations.
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Eighteen semi-structured qualitative interviews will be undertaken. Six interviews will
be conducted at each of the three sites with representatives from resident opposition
groups, objectors, developers and local and state planning authorities. Semistructured interview schedules will be developed encouraging respondents to reflect
on three key aspects of the planning process:
1. The housing supply timeline from initial engagement to construction including key
points of consultation, objection and appeal processes.
2. The impact of appeals or fast track approaches in terms of delay.
3. Perceptions of the planning process.
Interviews will be recorded and uploaded for transcription. Transcripts will be
anonymised and analysed to uncover stakeholders’ perceptions of planning where
third-party objection and appeal are bypassed, where full appeal is available, and
where an appeal has occurred in the context of earlier phases of consultation. The
interviews will also trace stakeholders’ perceptions after appeals decisions have been
made and construction is underway.
The qualitative interviews are significant in establishing stakeholder perceptions and
viewpoints along with residents’ experience and practices (Smith 2001). Pitcher et al.
(2008) argue that qualitative methods are well suited to uncovering diverse community
views, particularly in establishing how viewpoints are formed, and from this,
appropriate policy responses in complex situations can be developed. This set of
interviews will also link participatory planning approaches to housing supply.
The case study component of our research will proceed through the following stages:
 Identifying illustrative case studies.
 Examination of planning opposition group website and media content.
 Fieldwork: in-depth qualitative interviews and site visits.
 Examination of planning timelines and outcomes in the case studies involved.
 Analysis of media content, observational and interview data and writing up

illustrative case studies.
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6

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Higher density housing (HDH) has moved centre-stage in Australia over the past
decade, in compact city and social housing policies. But the rollout of HDH has come
face to face with public resistance embedded in the cultural norm of detached
housing. This project starts from the assumption that the potential for resident
opposition to distort the supply of HDH has placed mechanisms for public participation
in planning, specifically TPOAR, under new scrutiny. While debates around the
efficacy of TPOAR are traditionally framed around a long-standing opposition between
facilitating development and public participation in planning, this paper highlighted the
pressure that compact city and affordable housing policies are now placing on
TPOAR, along with the increasing use of fast tracking mechanisms to enable
development approval.
Against a backdrop of resident opposition, the report has shown that HDH produces a
complex policy challenge: namely, how to meet dwelling targets in existing urban
areas while making allowance for the reasonable rights of residents to influence
development, and at the same time, manage sectional interests. To help navigate this
path, this paper has outlined a research project that puts HDH at the centre of
debates around TPOAR and participatory planning.
To this end, we point to three key gaps in the research required to inform the current
reassessment of TPOAR in Australia and elsewhere. The first is to what extent are
TPOAR inhibiting housing supply compared to fast track approaches? The answer to
this question would provide a more detailed and precise account of the extent to
which ‘resident action’ is targeting higher density and/or social housing, and from this,
whether changes to TPOAR are likely to have a significant impact on housing supply.
At the same time, the assumption that fast tracking development approval processes
results in faster housing supply pipelines can be more carefully scrutinised and from
this, provide an indication of whether the removal of citizens’ rights is likely to improve
housing supply. Second, to what extent is access to TPOAR distributed across the
metropolitan area? There is some evidence that those most likely to exercise TPOAR
are also those living in localities with the highest socio-economic profiles, and there
has been no analysis of the distribution of the removal of rights. With a clearer sense
of the current distribution of rights, new reforms can minimise exclusionary trends.
Third, how effective are current TPOAR and fast track mechanisms from the
perspective of those who experience them most? To what extent does the removal of
TPOAR encourage new forms of resistance or collaboration; what form might they
take; and how might these responses feed back into the planning process?
With a clearer understanding of the wider policy context of HDH in Australian cities,
existing planning policies in relation to TPOAR, as well as research literature, this
Positioning Paper lays out the basis for the empirical part of our project. The empirical
part of the project consists of quantitative and qualitative components of data
collection and analysis, the results of which will be presented in the project’s Final
Report in May 2012. We hope that this paper and further project outputs will
contribute important and policy-relevant insights on the functioning of TPOAR, the
forms of resident resistance to higher density and social housing, housing supply
pressures, and participatory planning goals.
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